Analysis of the Liberian Conflict

outline of the Liberian employment priming to this involvement analysisThe Liberian deviation began in 1979 with civilised ferment and ended in 2003 with the forced exile of the then president Charles Taylor. During this 24years item, Liberia has had a number of significant turning points deuce politics-changing coups (1980 and 1990) and with them the assassination of 2 presidents, two civil fights, the first in 1989 90, the second from 1997 2003, and two elections, 1985 and 1997. The finale was deflower with systemic violence and kind rights violations which resulted in the death of 150 250,000 people and 1.5 one thousand thousand people displaced (FRTRCLDP, 2009 3) this is startling given a pre-war existence of 2.8 million.However, if we look the period from the rice riots of 1979 and the 1980 coup we find a steady escalation in direct violence starting from that period. Furthermore in that respect is substantial read of structural violence in pre-79 Liberia. The style of financing the regimes of Charles Taylor, Samuel Doe and the rightful(a) Whig caller, from 1979 to 2003 were real different during reign (Reno 1999,pp102 103 ), but nevertheless the political, hierarchical structures endured end-to-end this clock time, albeit with different leaders. This go on to allow a popular opinion elite to solicit the subjugated plurality as it had done for the previous century. Furthermore, the lack of faithfulness towards Taylor, by the wealthy elite, is compar suitable to the lack of animation for Does administration, by the same(p) elite, during Does final years in component.The similarities between Taylors reign, the Doe era and the period of rule forward to 1979 demonstrate a cyclical nature to the contravene. and so, unless the period under review in this struggle compendium is establish roughly one of the turning points noted above, the selection of a time is closely arbitrary if chosen during this period. Furthermore, if one tries to analyse the conflict at the time of the first civil war or post 1990, the discourse leads to an interrogation of the conflict and structures during Does rule, and ultimately, this leads to an psychoanalysis of the social structures and conflict potential prior to the 1979/80 uprising. In order to provide a time frame for evaluation, this analysis will strain on the period of 1979 1989 beca handling what comes thereafter is very overmuch a product of what came before. participation AnalysesThe aim of a conflict analysis is to provide a better understanding of the causes and drivers of a given conflict. some(prenominal) leading development agencies have designed conflict analysis tool arounds to servicing them to better target their development work and to ensure that they do not aggravate a conflict situation through that development. A heavyset of few prominent conflict analyses can be found at Appendix 2MethodologyThe aim of this conflict analysis is to mur der an understanding of the root causes and manifestations of violence in Liberia over the period 1979 1990, in particular focusing at the countrified level. The analysis will in either case identify and analyse sub-national, regional and internationalistic actors that affected the conflict.The DfID strategical Conflict Assessment consists of three partsConflict AnalysisAnalysis of responses to the conflictStrategies and options for dealing with the situationThe Conflict Analysis Framework of the taxment examines the interest beasTable 1 DfID Conflict Analysis FrameworkConflict Analysis(i) Structures(ii) Actors(iii) DynamicsAnalysis of long term factors underlying conflict credentialsEconomic policy-making kindAnalysis of conflict actorsInterestsRelationsCapacities field pansy agendasIncentivesAnalysis ofLong term trends of conflictTriggers for increased violenceCapacities for managing conflictLikely future conflict scenarios(Great Britain, DfID, p10, Table 1).The DfID ma nnequin provides a tool which is easily transferable to analyse the Liberian conflict within the parameters set. A secondary aim of this analysis is to see whether we can shed any light on the greed versus grievance debate and to help value the predominance of one set of motivating factors over the other in the case of the Liberian conflict.Greed and grievanceThe principle greed arguments focus on the scotch benefit that might motivate an individual, or host, to press and then continue fighting (Mac Ginty 2006 69)Three pre-conditions, have been identified, by Collier, as conflict catalysts in greed based theories. These be access to uncreated commodities, the proportion of young men in family and the amount of nurture available (Collier 2000, 93). Collier goes so far as to rank the enormousness of these factors but does not suggest that all three need to be present at the same time.Grievance theories of conflict emphasise arguments of ideology, ethnicity, homosexual needs a nd inter-group competition (Mac Ginty 2006 71). Idoelogy and ethnicity are lots utilize by the secular in explaining conflict causation, but a fuller analysis often identifies these as captureing a conflict or else than initiating it, leaders might use ethno-religious calls to rally the troops, but this is often not the underlying cause (Barash and Webel, 2002 15) . ground on statistical research, Collier argues (2000 96) that grievance theories of conflict causation are so unimportant compared to the prevalence of greed based motives, that, grievance based explanations of civil war are so seriously wrong. However, he does admit that that under the right circumstances (such as by-line and frugal slump) grievances motives can be explained.StructuresSocieties that are socially fr performancealised along ethnic or religious divides are significantly less prone to conflict (Collier, 2000 98). Social division in Liberia lay between 17 groups (FRTRCLDP 2009 51). The first group co nsists of the original settlers from the US freed slaves who arrived in Liberia in 1822, this group were kat oncen as the Americo-Liberians together with the Caribbean freed slaves they constituted 5% of the population. The remaining groups were formed from 16 resolve innate tribal groups.There were further splits along religious lines. The US settlers brought with them Christianity which spread amongst the population. Liberia too had an Islamic population from the African-Arabic slavers of the 16th and 17th centuries. By 1980, this provided a blend of approximately 40% Christian, 20% Muslim, 20% endemical religions (and a number of individuals practicing some form of hybrid religion). According to the hypothesis, Liberia would be very unlikely to collapse into civil war due to its non-homogeneous nature. This was in fact the case rprio to the arrival of the Americo-liberians A study by Olukujo (as cited in the FRTRCLDP 2009 51) notes that for hundreds of years the 16 tribes had lived in relative peace with intermarriage, modern reading and westernised Christianity, Islam and other strange influences blurring tribal ethnicity. Furthermore, all(prenominal) family had a family head and each village a council of elders who would resolve conflicts.However, when analysing the Liberian political and economic structures prior to 1980, we find that it is difficult to untangle the two strands this is because the Liberian system was very hierarchical with a belief elite and a proletariat there was limited, if any middle class. The establishment of the Liberian political system, in the eighteenth century, was based on a US constitutional model (Outram, 1999 164) with a Senate and a House of representatives. However, only the Americo-Liberians were allowed to vote. The political elite passed laws which kept the natal people subjugated, both politically and economically,Evidence of this self-perpetuation can be seen in the fact that the True Whig Party was the onl y political party that held military officer from 1877 until the coup in 1980, even the previous electric chair, President Tubman, remained in office for an unbroken period of 37 years. It is very unlikely that the True Whig Party would have been voted out prior to the coup, as the indigenous population did not have the right to vote, until a constitutional change in 1984.Therefore those who had political positions were also either economically supply or fiscally well connected. Those without property or power were subjugated by this ruling elite known as a patron-client relationship (Outram, 1999 165). The President had a significant amount of power vested in him, as both the mind of State and Head of Government. President Tubman consolidated power in his position, secure as Doe did 10 years later, and both following unprofitable coups. So the evidence suggests that the ruling elite in society were able to exploit self interest and so were motivated by greed.We shall now tur n our attention to the motives of the subjugated. When a rebel organisation has the potential to supercharge sufficient size that the prospect of a conflict has a graphic chance of success, then individuals will be more likely to vex together for grievance based reasons (Collier, 2000 99). So, if Liberia is viewed through the lens of the masses, then the society is much less divided with split of 95% indigenous population to 5% ruling elite (FRTRCLDP 2009 5). This allows us to evaluate the grievance conjecture model due to Liberias homogenous nature and therefore its propensity to civil war for grievance reasons.The following lists examples of laws that were passed that demonstrate the lack of rights tahts wereexperienceed by the indigenous peopleREFERNCESExamples of the laws passed by the government included the 1864 Ports of Entry Act, which restricted foreign trade with indigenous people, the indigenous werent granted citizenship until 1904. In 1926 the government leased 1 m illion acres of land to the firestone company, land which was inhabited, they then conscripted local anesthetic labour for the company and other neighbouring countries. In 1931the Government of Liberia was requested to champion its position over allegations from the League of Nations of svaling the indigenous population. .Economic1864 passed laws baning tradePoliticalUS constitiional arrangementSingle party from1877,Political eltieSocial rile to education forced adoptionreferred to as barbariansno tribal problems juncture attempts but more for popular support context of the regional issues at the time.Indeed when Samuel Doe rose to power in the 1980 coup he did so onthe back of a wave of local grievances.Dynamics revelation of ViolenceDefintion of direct and structural Violence, definition of peace and conflictcomparability or 1985 Vs 1955Structural no right to vote, land taken away, human salvery and conscript labour, not even citizens til 1904Quotes form TRCRef topdown and bott om upMac ginty p 77, 3rd feature of conflict..CorruptionIssues regarding money and support for wealthy eliteIssues of 23 million to release Ellen and the 400m in aid.Table 2 Comparison of ViolencePre 1980Post 1980 Ruling elect(ip) (Americo Liberian) No right to vote for masses Power vested in the President President is Chief of State and Head of Government Army used as security Suppression of uprising 1955 Huge personal financial incentives to stay in power foreign investment NO pagan tensions (Olukoju 2006) Ruling Elite (Krahn tribe) No Right to vote for the masses select overturned Political structure remains the same Power vested in the President Army used as security Harsh prohibition of coup by Gen Quiwonkpa 2985 Huge financial incentives to stay in power Escalation of Structural violence and direct violence Inter-ethnic fighting Corruption increases as a survival mechanismConclusionViolence escalation tableThe following table summarises the level of violence during the pe riod and notes the factors that sustain or compound the violence.Table 3 Violence ManifestationViolenceManifestation and interpretationInitiation Colonial structures and exploitation in Liberia lead to Localised grievances and structural violence,Create opportunities forSustainment Individual actors greed nepotism to galvanise own support fractionalisation leads to ethno-tribalism No structural change takes place continued marginalisation / HR violationsWhich createsEscalation Further grievances which fuel the conflict Direct Violence as a survival mechanismPoverty and lack of opportunity, intensified by the war have helped promote the attractiveness of fighting as a means of survival (Atkinson, 1997)The story of Liberia between 1979 and 1990 is one of action, inaction and reaction action by the proletariat and ruling governments (pre and post 1979), inaction by the international connection and reaction by regional actors to the.The violence during this period escalated from soc ietal structural violence in 1979 to overt direct violence against the noncombatant population and opposition groups in 1990. This resulted in an increase of displaced persons, frustrating neighbouring countries ominous to de-stabilised the region. The actions by regional countries coupled with the frustrations of the masses provided the circumstances which could lead to a second coup, and the first civil war in 1989.The DfID Conflict Analysis Framework provides a useful tool with which to analyse a extended conflict such as Liberia. By examining the structures and dynamics in feed at both national and local levels it has been possible to see that the Liberian conflict shows signs of greed and grievance motivations with each playing off the other. The ruling elite motivated by the prospects of substantial wealth and pursuing a desperate attempt to hold onto power, and grievance by the oppressed masses with little prospect of anything better unless they rise up and rebel against the elite.epilogueThe greed and grievance cycle, as discussed in the background to this analysis continued to play out during Charles Taylors reign. Taylor has suggested that his motives for staging a coup had been to force regime change of a brutal dictatorship (Ref). That might have been his unselfish outward cry, indeed narratives of grievance play much better with this the international community than narratives of greed. (Collier, 2000 92). It is clear now that Taylors coup was heavily supported internationally, and regionally (Ref).What is also evident now is that within the first 6 months of Taylors charge for Monrovia, he had not only gained contain of 90% of the country, but had also amassed a personal wealth of USD 3.6million. It is also estimated that during the period 1991 1994, Taylor had a personal income of USD 420 450 million per year (REF). In this context it of difficult to see how greed rather than grievance was not his motivating factor.The economics of a war tear society, (particularly one which has an abundance of extremely profitable primary commodities) has an ability to sustain conflict. Once the shackles of a oppressive regime are unable to control the population, the rise of strongmen and warlords is possible . Then, fuelled, by the potential of substantial wealth, they will accomplish to keep the inferno of conflict burning.Conflict AnalysesThe origination Bank Conflict Analysis Framework. This uses 6 variables (social and ethnic relations, governance and political institutions, human rights/security, economic structure and performance, environmental and natural resources and external factors) which are analysed against given criteria. These are graded and then linked to their impact on the conflict and on the countrys poverty level. This framework allows for the extraction of underlying causes and the opportunities for conflict.The US AID Conflict Assessment Framework focuses on Means, Motives and Opportunities and also incl udes regional and international factors. The framework therefore allows for a holistic approach and also provides an understanding of the prevalence of greed or grievance agendas in conflict zones. Like the World Bank conflict analysis it highlights causes and opportunities for conflict.The Department For International Development (DfID) Strategic Conflict Assessment (Great Britain, DfID) is a tool that was developed by DfID to assessrisks of negative effects of conflict on programmesrisks of programmes or policies exacerbating conflictopportunities to improve the effectiveness of development interventions in contributing to conflict legal profession and reduction.The assessment criteria allow the assessment to focus on programmes or projects, or at a strategic level on a country or region (Great Britain, DfID, p6).